CALL FOR PAPERS
Asia Pacific Business Review Special Issue:
Governance Reforms in the South Korean Chaebol:
Implications for Family Conglomerates in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond
Guest Editors:
Professor Chris Rowley, Kellogg College, Oxford University & Cass Business School, City, University of London, UK
Professor Yongwook Jun, Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Korea
Professor Ingyu Oh, Kansai Gaidai University, Osaka, Japan
The recent announcement by a scion of the Samsung founding family, Jae-Yong Lee of Samsung Electronics, that labour unions would be legalized and father-son succession of the ownership and control structure of the family conglomerate ended, seems to signal the end of the chaebol governance structure that we know of. The South Korean chaebols have tenaciously maintained family ownership, succession, and managerial control, despite harsh criticism from society and hostile government policies against their governance structure (Jung 1995; Oh and Park 2001; Redding 2004; Rowley and Bae 2004; Rowley and Warner 2014; Warner and Rowley 2014; Oh and Jun 2016; Oh 2018).
This particularistic local governance structure of big family conglomerates was a result of the protracted threats from the consistently hostile governments that had tried to curb such family big businesses after the infamous precedent set by the US Occupation Forces in its purge of the Japanese zaibatsu conglomerates (Jung 1995; Oh 2018). However, what was pivotal in the study of the chaebols were their resilience and success not only in domestic, but also global, markets through technological and organizational innovations. Their unique family ownership and control was pivotal in the success of electronics and semiconductor firms like Samsung and their ultimate global victory over Sony, Panasonic, Toshiba, and other Japanese electronics giants (Jun 1987; Cherry 2003; Fitzgerald and Kim 2004; Chang 2008; Oh and Jun 2016).
However, during the heyday of chaebol development and growth, many social, economic, and political problems ensued one after another. Among these, corruption and labour suppression loomed large leading to political democratization in 1987 and the full legalization of labour unions in 1997 (Bae et al. 1997; Oh and Park 2001; Rowley 2003; Bae and Rowley 2003; Jun et al. 2019). In tandem with political democratization and political punishment for corruption, global financial crises that had hit hard South Korea in 1997 and 2008, augmented the pressure toward corporate governance reforms of chaebols despite their phenomenal business success throughout the 20th and the first two decades of the 21st centuries. The hostile governments in South Korea repeatedly targeted family ownership succession by imposing huge inheritance taxes, while imprisoning chaebol CEOs who evaded paying such taxes. Simultaneously, the social demand of meritocracy and managerial professionalism at chaebols has accumulated into a social and political force, furthering the pressures of chaebol reforms (Rowley 2003; Redding 2004; Rowley and Bae 2004; Cho et al. 2014; Kim and Lee 2018; Oh 2018; Jun et al. 2019).
Despite the chaebol reforms in labour relations and corporate governance, Samsung remained adamant at preserving the infamous ‘no union’ policy and the father-son succession of ownership and control. The final blow against Samsung came after the election of the Moon government that had arrested the previous president for corruption, directly implicating Samsung in the process (Doucette 2017). Lee Jae-Yong, while still waiting for the final verdict from various court cases regarding the violation of inheritance tax laws, labour relations laws, and anti-corruption laws, finally gave in and openly announced the end of the ‘no union’ policy at Samsung and the ending of the father-son succession of the top managerial position in the chaebol.
Facing the abrupt conclusion of the chaebol corporate governance, APBR invites the submission of papers for a workshop and subsequent Special Issue that analyse chaebol governance from both theoretical and managerial perspectives. We are looking for works not only on the South Korean family conglomerates but also on their global implications for similar firms in the Asia Pacific and beyond. We are seeking papers that deal with the causes of corporate reforms in chaebols, reforms and chaebol performance, reforms and their social implications. Comparative studies of corporate reforms involving two or more family conglomerates in different countries are also invited. However, we are not including finance and accounting studies of corporate governance reforms.
Topics include, but are not limited to:
• Theories of corporate governance for family conglomerates
• Chaebol corporate governance and reforms
• The future of chaebol evolution
• Corporate governance reforms and performances in family conglomerates
• State-business relations toward governance reforms in family conglomerates
• Social and ethical implications of the governance reforms in family conglomerates
• Globalization and governance reforms in family conglomerates
• Organizational culture and resilience in family conglomerates
• Governance reforms and innovation in family conglomerates
• Implications for European and American family conglomerates
Timelines
Sep. 30, 2020: Deadline for abstracts
Oct. 31, 2020: Acceptance of abstracts
March 31, 2021: Deadline for the submission of completed papers
May 31, 2021: First review results
June 30: Submission of revised drafts
July 31: Final acceptance decision
Publication of Selected Papers in APBR in 2021
For questions in the first instance contact: Professor Chris Rowley at apbr@city.ac.uk and Professor Ingyu Oh at apbr@iwahs.org.
References
Bae, J. and Rowley, C. 2003. “Changes and continuities in South Korean HRM.” Asia Pacific Business Review 9(4): 76-105.
Bae, J., Rowley, C., Kim, D.H. and Lawler, J.J. 1997. “Korean industrial relations at the crossroads: The recent labour troubles.” Asia Pacific Business Review 3(3): 148-160.
Chang, S.J. 2008. Sony vs. Samsung: The Inside Story of the Electronics Giants’ Battle for Global Supremacy. Hoboken: Wiley.
Cherry, J. 2003. “The ‘Big Deals’ and Hynix semiconductor: State–business relations in post-crisis Korea.” Asia Pacific Business Review 10(2): 178-198.
Cho, Y.H., Yu, G.C., Joo, M.K. and Rowley, C., 2014. “Changing corporate culture over time in South Korea.” Asia Pacific Business Review 20(1), pp.9-17.
Doucette, J., 2017. “The occult of personality: Korea's candlelight protests and the impeachment of Park Geun-hye.” Journal of Asian Studies 76(4): 851-860.
Fitzgerald, R. and Kim, Y.C. 2004. “Business strategy, government and globalization: policy and miscalculation in the Korean electronics industry.” Asia Pacific Business Review 10(3-4): 441-462.
Jun, I.W., Kim, K.I. and Rowley, C. 2019. “Organizational culture and the tolerance of corruption: the case of South Korea.” Asia Pacific Business Review 25(4): 534-553.
Jun, Y. 1987. “The reverse direct investment: the case of the Korean consumer electronics industry.” International Economic Journal 1(3): 91-104.
Jung, K.H., 1995. “Changing business-government relations in Korea.” Asia Pacific Business Review 1(3): 98-112.
Kim, A. and Lee, Y. 2018. “Family firms and corporate social performance: evidence from Korean firms.” Asia Pacific Business Review 24(5): 693-713.
Oh, I. 2018. Mafioso, Big Business and the Financial Crisis: The State-Business Relations in South Korea and Japan. London: Routledge.
Oh, I. and Jun, H. 2016. “Economic miracle.” In Handbook of Modern Korean History, edited by M. Seth, pp. 295-313. London: Routledge.
Oh, I. and Park, H.J. 2001. “Shooting at a moving target: Four theoretical problems in explaining the dynamics of the Chaebol.” Asia Pacific Business Review 7(4): 44-69.
Redding, G. 2004. “The conditional relevance of corporate governance advice in the context of Asian business systems.” Asia Pacific Business Review 10(3-4): 272-291.
Rowley, C. 2003. “The Korean economy, business and labour: miracle or mirage?” Asia Pacific Business Review 9(3): 116-122.
Rowley, C. and Warner, M. 2014. “The changing contours of Korean management and business.” Asia Pacific Business Review 20(1): 1-8.
Warner, M. and Rowley, C. 2014. “Context and implications for Korean management and business.” Asia Pacific Business Review 20(1): 197-207.
Rowley, C. and Bae, J. 2004. “Big business in South Korea: The reconfiguration process.” Asia Pacific Business Review 10(3-4): 302-323.
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